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This paper assesses the economy-wide impact of implementing and financing a universal 
or basic income grant (BIG) in South Africa. The various financing scenarios suggested 
by the proponents of the grant are presented, and these are compared using an applied 
general equilibrium model for the South African economy. The results indicate that the 
required changes in direct and indirect tax rates needed to finance the grant without 
increasing the government deficit are substantially higher than currently predicted. 
Furthermore, the alternative of reducing government recurrent expenditure to finance the 
BIG will undoubtedly undermine other government policy objectives. The paper 
therefore proposes a shift in the current debate, away from determining which of the 
individual financing options is preferable, towards an acknowledgement that a ￿balanced￿ 
approach is likely to provide the only feasible scenario. Furthermore, the impact of the 
grant on economic growth is found to hinge on its ability to enhance factor productivity. 
These results suggest that the possibility of South Africa becoming the continent￿s first 
welfare state is as likely to rest with the macroeconomic impacts of financing the grant, 
as with the ability of the grant to address the country￿s prevailing poverty.  
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While South Africa is acknowledged as having one of the most unequal income 
distributions in the world (World Bank, 2002), these distinctively high levels of relative 
poverty should not overshadow the severe absolute poverty that also exists within the 
country. Using an international benchmark of absolute income-poverty reveals that 
around one fifth of South African￿s live on less than US$1 per day (May, 1998; Ngwane 
et al, 2001). Further research, using non-income-based measures of poverty, shows that 
16 percent of the adult population are illiterate (UNDP, 1999), 30 percent are 
unemployed (May, 1998), and one in four children are malnourished (Mgijima, 1999). 
When coupled with risk, vulnerability and rural marginalization, it is clear that a large 
number of South Africans are trapped in a state of unacceptably low standards of living.   
 
In the context of such poverty, it is not surprising that the current South African 
government is now placing significant emphasis on the country￿s social security system 
(DSD, 1997). In 2000 the Department of Social Development commissioned the Taylor 
Committee to investigate the current system￿s merits and shortcomings (Taylor, 2002). 
One of the principal conclusions of the Taylor Report is that ￿the existing social security 
programs do not adequately address the problem of poverty.￿ In order to close the gaps in 
the system and to encourage a better take-up of the available grants, the Taylor 
committee recommended comprehensive reform and the introduction of a ￿basic income 
grant￿ (BIG).  
 
This universal grant would amount to R100 or US$10 per month, and would be paid to 
individuals over and above existing government transfers. Despite the proposed phase-in, 
by which children under the age of 18 would be the first to receive the grant, ultimately 
this transfer would be made available to all South Africans regardless of age or income 
level. Such a policy-move would make South Africa the first African welfare state (Jeter, 
2002). 
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This paper attempts to determine the economic and, to a lesser extent, the political 
feasibility of implementing and financing the basic income grant in South Africa. The 
next section provides a brief overview of the current social security system as well as an 
outline of the debate surrounding the proposed BIG. The paper then assesses the various 
financing scenarios suggested by the proponents of the grant using an applied general 
equilibrium model for South Africa. This model is described in Section 3, and the results 
from the study are presented in Section 4. The paper concludes by drawing out the 
implications of the results for the current debate, as well as providing areas where further 
research is necessary.  
 
2. The Proposed Basic Income Grant 
 
Given the high levels of poverty in South Africa, both the previous and current 
governments introduced some form of social security. By 2001, around 3.5 million of the 
total population of 41 million received state assistance (Taylor, 2002). Currently, the two 
largest components of social security spending are the old age pension and the disability 
grant, which account for 60 and 24 percent of the social security budget respectively 
(May, 1998). Both programs are non-contributory and means tested, and in 1998 
amounted to an average R490 or US$49 per month transfer to 2.5 million people. 
However, despite being targeted at individuals, the pension program in particular is likely 
to support the living standards of individuals beyond their immediate beneficiaries. 
According to May (1998), the state pension offers many poor households a regular 
income and provides a basic level of food security against seasonal and other 
fluctuations. Nevertheless, over three quarters of adults and children currently live in 
households with no pensioners, and as such many of South Africa￿s poor are not even 
indirect beneficiaries of the social security system (Taylor, 2002).
2 
 
                                                 
2 According to Duncan (2001), the value of current government transfers to the poorest 40 percent of the 
population is R42 or US$4.20 per person per month. However, this figure might be misleading for two 
reasons: (i) not all households contain pensioners and children, and (ii) not all government transfers to 
pensioners and children are likely to be evenly pooled amongst all individuals within their beneficiary 
households. While acknowledging this shortcoming, this result does indicate that a BIG of R100 per month 
is a substantial increase on Duncan￿s estimate of existing per capita transfers.  
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By avoiding a means test, it is expected that a BIG will be able to close the poverty gap 
by 74 percent (Samson et al, 2002) and effectively reach the 13.8 million South Africans 
in the poorest households currently not receiving, even indirectly, any form of social 
assistance (Duncan, 2001). Furthermore, the Taylor Report (2002) indicates that the grant 
￿has the potential, more than any other possible social protection intervention, to reduce 
poverty and promote human development and sustainable livelihoods.￿  
 
According to Samson et al (2002), the overall economic impact of the BIG is transmitted 
through three mechanisms. These include: (i) an increase in factor productivity resulting 
from an improvement in health, education and social stability; (ii) an increase in labor 
supply as people would able to spend more time in search of employment and be able to 
finance their own entrepreneurial activities, and an increase in labor demand resulting 
from the increase in productivity; and finally (iii) an increase in economic growth 
through an increase in aggregate demand, and through a compositional shift in income 
away from households with import- and capital-intensive spending patterns. The ability 
of the BIG to generate the above three positive impacts on the economy is critical, since 
it is assumed that the predicted long-term economic growth will lessen the negative fiscal 
impact of the grant. 
 
Given a population of approximately 41 million people, the BIG would amount to an 
annual transfer of R49 billion in current prices.
3 This grant represents 5 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), and triples current government transfer spending.
4 The 
magnitude of this additional spending has raised serious concerns about whether the 
current fiscal budget can afford to implement this policy (Forrest and Kindra, 2002).   
 
Due to the prevailing inequality in South Africa as well as the scale of the proposed 
grant, the BIG has received considerable publicity both within and outside of the country 
(Jeter, 2002). Beyond the ruling African National Congress￿ interest in the grant, the 
                                                 
3 Taylor (2002) estimates the gross cost of the BIG to be R43.8 billion, thus implying a population of 
approximately 36 million people.  
4 In order to remain consistent with data sources used in later sections of the paper, the BIG is adjusted to 
1998 prices, and the calculations are based on the 1998 social accounting matrix for South Africa (Thurlow 
and van Seventer, 2002).   
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country￿s main opposition party has selected the BIG as a key component of its political 
campaign (Andrew, 2001), and an independent coalition of trade unions, non-government 
organizations, and health and religious institutions has been formed to promote the 
implementing of the grant (COSATU, 2002; Duncan, 2001). 
 
A number of financing scenarios have been suggested by the various organizations that 
support the grant. One scenario suggests that the government increase sales taxes in order 
to raise the necessary revenue (Taylor, 2002). The BIG Coalition estimates that an 
increase in sales taxes by 2 percentage points, from its current book rate of 14 percent, 
should be sufficient to cover the additional cost to government (Duncan, 2001). The 
Congress of South African Trade Unions, which has traditionally been opposed to 
increases in sales taxes due to their regressive structure, has recommended that a 
￿solidarity tax￿ be imposed on high-income earners (COSATU, 2002). Along similar 
lines, the research underlying the Taylor Report suggests that the current structure of 
direct taxes in South Africa is such that personal and corporate tax rates could be raised 
(Samson et al, 2002; Taylor, 2002). Finally, it is also possible that part of the financing of 
the new grant might be achieved through a compositional shift in current government 
spending away from consumption expenditure on goods and services.  
 
Although the Taylor Report made reference to its own assessment of the financial 
viability of the BIG, it did not make these findings explicit, preferring rather to suggest 
that detailed financing issues were beyond its mandate (Forrest and Kindra, 2002). Given 
both the scale of the BIG and the contention surrounding its financing, it is necessary to 
undertake a rigorous assessment to determine not only whether certain financing options 
are more economically feasible than others, but also what the economy-wide impact of 
the grant and the suggested financing package will be on the South African economy.  
 
Using a recently constructed computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for South 
Africa, this study simulates the macroeconomic impact of the proposed BIG under a 
series of financing scenarios. These include: adjustments in sales tax rates; adjustments in  
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direct tax rates; a decrease in government consumption expenditure; and a balanced 
combination of these three financing options.  
 
Before turning to a description of the CGE model, it is important to emphasize that this 
study is primarily concerned with determining the impact of the BIG on the South 
African macroeconomy, and assessing the financing options discussed above. While 
some conclusions are drawn regarding the policy￿s distributional effects on household 
incomes, it is by no means an attempt to fully capture the ability of the BIG to alleviate 
broadly defined poverty. On the contrary, beyond the quantitative income-measure used 
in this study, poverty also encompasses such factors as vulnerability, social and 
geographic marginalization, and a lack of participation. While these dimensions of 
poverty must be taken into account when weighing the effectiveness of the BIG against 
other forms of social security, the ability of the BIG to address these areas of deprivation 
is beyond the scope of this income-based and largely macro-focused study.  
 
3. Model Description and Data Sources 
 
The macroeconomic impact of implementing and financing a basic income grant is 
modeled using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the South African 
economy, which is benchmarked on the year 1998 and is presented in Thurlow and van 
Seventer (2002). This class of model has developed from the neoclassical modeling 
tradition originally presented in Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982). A detailed 
mathematical description of the model can be found in Lofgren et al (2001).  





In accordance with the South African social accounting matrix (SAM), the model 
distinguishes between 43 productive activities and the 43 commodities that they produce. 
Although activities and commodities are equally disaggregated in this model, their 
distinction allows individual activities to produce more than a single commodity and 
conversely, for a single commodity to be produced by more than one activity. The model 
identifies four factors of production: three types of labor (unskilled, semi-skilled and 
skilled) and the production factor capital. Producers in the model make decisions in order 
to maximize profits, with the choice between factors being governed by a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Once determined, these factors are combined 
with fixed-share intermediates using a Leontief specification. Profit maximization implies 
that the factors receive income where marginal revenue equals marginal cost based on 
endogenous relative prices. 
 
Substitution possibilities also exist between production for the domestic and the foreign 
markets. This decision of producers is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) function which differentiates between exported and domestic goods, and by doing 
so, captures any time or quality differences between the two products. Profit 
maximization drives producers to sell in those markets where they can achieve the 
highest returns. These returns are based on domestic and export prices (where the latter 
are determined by world prices times the exchange rate adjusted for any taxes). Under the 
small-country assumption, South Africa is assumed to face a perfectly elastic world 
demand at a fixed world price. The final ratio of exports to domestic goods is determined 
by the endogenous interaction of relative prices for these two commodity types. 
 
Further substitution possibilities exist between imported and domestic goods under a CES 
Armington specification. Such substitution can take place both in final and intermediates 
usage. The Armington elasticities vary across sectors, with lower elasticities reflecting 
greater differences between domestic and imported goods. Again under the small country 
assumption, South Africa is assumed to face infinitely elastic world supply at fixed world  
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prices. The final ratio of imports to domestic goods is determined by the cost minimizing 
decision-making of domestic demanders based on the relative prices of imports and 
domestic goods (both of which include relevant taxes).  
 
The model distinguishes between various institutions within the South African economy, 
including enterprises, the government, and 14 types of households. The household 
categories are disaggregated across income deciles with the exception of the top decile, 
which has five income divisions. Households and enterprises receive income in payment 
for producers￿ use of their factors of production. Both institutions pay direct taxes to 
government (based on fixed tax rates), save (based on marginal propensities to save), and 
make transfers to the rest of the world. Enterprises pay their remaining income to 
households in the form of dividends. Households, unlike enterprises, use their income to 
consume commodities under a linear expenditure system (LES) of demand.  
 
The government receives income from imposing activity, sales, and direct taxes, and 
import tariffs, and then makes transfers to households, enterprises, and the rest of the 
world. The government also purchases commodities in the form of government 
consumption expenditure, and the remaining income of government is (dis)saved. All 
savings from households, enterprises, government and the rest of the world (foreign 
savings) are collected in a savings pool from which investment is financed. 
 
Macro Adjustment Rules 
 
The model includes three broad macroeconomic accounts: the government balance, the 
current account, and the savings and investment account. In order to bring about 
equilibrium in the various macro accounts, it is necessary to specify a set of 
￿macroclosure￿ rules, which provide a mechanism through which adjustment is assumed 
to take place.  
 
A savings-driven closure was assumed in order to balance the South African savings-
investment account. Under this closure, the savings rates of households and enterprises  
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are fixed, and real investment quantities adjust to ensure that the level of investment and 
savings are equal at equilibrium.
5 
 
For the current account it was assumed that a flexible exchange rate adjusts in order to 
maintain a fixed level of foreign savings. In other words, the external balance is held 
fixed in foreign currency. In the government account, the decision of which variables will 
ensure macroeconomic balance varies according to the particular financing option being 
analyzed, and this is discussed alongside the simulations in the next section. Finally, the 
domestic price index was chosen as the numeraire.  
 
On the microeconomic side, firms are assumed always to be on their factor demand 
curves. In the South African model it was assumed that both unskilled and semi-skilled 
labor face unemployment, and that this labor category is therefore paid a fixed real wage 
under the condition of a perfectly elastic labor supply. This assumption is in accordance 
with the Taylor Report (2002), which predicted an increase in labor supply following the 
introduction of the BIG. For the remaining labor and capital categories it was assumed 
that factor supplies are fixed and wages are free to adjust.  
 
Calibration and Solution 
 
The term ￿calibration￿ refers to the use of observed values for a particular year to 
calculate the share coefficients found in the CGE model. For the South African model, 
these values were obtained from the 1998 social accounting matrix (SAM) compiled by 
Thurlow and van Seventer (2002). Additional information on the values and data sources 
of the behavioral parameters can also be found in the above paper. The model parameters 
are calculated so that the initial equilibrium reproduces the base-year values from the 
SAM. The relevant exogenous policy variables describing the BIG are then adjusted and 
the model is re-solved for a new equilibrium. The values of the endogenous variables in 
                                                 
5 There is no specification of the financial sector in the CGE model. For example, the crowding-out of 
investment is assumed to be driven by implicit changes in the bond or money market. For example, the 
government issues additional bonds and, in order to sell these to the private sector, it is necessary to raise 
interest ra tes. This increase in interest rates drives down the level of investment, but all this is outside of 
the CGE model.  
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this new equilibrium are compared to their initial values, and based on these changes 
conclusions are drawn concerning the impact of the new grant.  
 
Limitations of the Model 
 
The sectoral and institutional detail of this economy-wide model makes it the ideal 
analytical tool for this study. However, by being a static rather than dynamic model, it is 
limited in its ability to assess the entire impact of the BIG. For example, it does not take 
into account the sequencing of adjustment over time, or make predictions as to how long 
the adjustment will take. In using before-after comparative static analysis, the model does 
not take into account the dynamic feedback effects of savings and investment decisions 
on subsequent periods. 
 
A second limitation of this model is in the treatment of labor and households. No 
distinction is made between formal and informal labor, and the model does not take into 
account the intra-household distribution of income. Furthermore, the simulations in the 
model assume a perfectly targeted transfer from government to households. Such an 
assumption is likely to overstate the take-up of the grant, while understating its 
administrative cost, especially given the corruption that is present in the South African 
social security system (Camerer, 1997).
6  
 
In regards to the three mechanisms for economic growth described by Samson et al 
(2001), this paper does not take into account the dynamic impact of possible factor 
productivity changes. Although higher productivity due to increased transfers is an 
appealing assumption, this study does not simulate improved productivity, since no 
quantitative evidence of the magnitude of the resulting productivity increase is available. 
However, the specification of the labor market does allow for changes in the demand and 
supply of labor (although such changes are limited to particular labor categories as 
                                                 
6 Teggemann (2001) states that ￿in South Africa￿, an estimated 10 percent of the social security budget is 
lost due to fraud, theft and inefficiencies.￿  
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described above), as well as changes in the magnitude and composition of aggregate 
demand. 
 
4. Financing a Universal Grant in South Africa 
 
In response to the debate surrounding the macroeconomic impact of implementing and 
financing a BIG, four financing options are investigated in this section. Since the 
database underlying the CGE model is for 1998, the BIG is modeled as an R85 per month 
transfer to individuals in 1998 prices, as this is equivalent to a R100 per month transfer to 
individuals in 2001 prices.
7 Furthermore, since the model contains household income 
deciles rather than individuals, it was necessary to multiply the grant given to each 
household by the number of people in each household income decile (thereby accounting 
for the typically larger size of poorer households), and then transfer this aggregate grant 
to the 14 representative household income classes. The information on population by 
household income decile was obtained from Leibbrandt et al (2000).
8  
 
According to the SAM, the government deficit stood at 3.3 percent of GDP in 1998. In 
these simulations it is assumed that the government is unable to adjust its deficit in order 
to finance the BIG (which amounts to R41.3 billion in 1998 prices or 5.3 percent of 
GDP). The impacts of this universal transfer are discussed below for each of the 
financing options. 
 
Financing through Increased Indirect Commodity Taxes 
 
Samson et al (2002) suggest that the BIG can be financed through changes in the tax 
system, thus making the need to resort to deficit spending unnecessary. In response to this 
claim, the first simulation finances the BIG solely through an increase in sales taxes on 
commodities (which include all indirect taxes excluding import duties). The initial sales 
                                                 
7 This calculation was based on changes in the consumer price index as reported by the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB, 2002).  
8 The population breakdown in Leibbrandt et al (2000) did not disaggregate the highest income decile into 
the five categories included in this model.  
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tax rates weighted by each household￿s consumption basket can be found in the first 
column of Table 1. These results show that the current tax system is indeed regressive, 
with the lowest income decile paying a weighted tax rate of 8.5 percent on their total 
consumption spending, as opposed to only 5.9 percent for the highest income category.
9   
 
The impact of raising sales tax rates to finance the BIG is to drive up consumer prices by 
7.6 percent (as shown in the second column of Table 2). This negative impact on real 
household consumption spending is partially offset by the universal transfer from 
government to households such that aggregate real consumption expenditure rises by 0.2 
percent. However, low-income households benefit more from the transfer since they 
comprise a larger proportion of the population receiving the BIG, and as such, there is a 
compositional shift in income away from high-income households towards low-income 
households.  
                                                 
9 These tax rates differ from the book rate of 14 percent since they are based on collections and include 
￿zero-rated￿ goods, excise duties and ￿sin￿ taxes.  
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Table 1: Changes in Sales Tax Rates  
 
Percentage point deviation from initial 
rate under each financing option 
Household income 
deciles 








of additional tax 
burden borne by 
income deciles 
0 ￿ 10  8.5  4.8  1.7  1.9 
10 ￿ 20  8.3  4.6  1.6  2.5 
20 ￿ 30  7.9  4.4  1.6  3.3 
30 ￿ 40  7.6  4.3  1.5  4.1 
40 ￿ 50  7.3  4.1  1.4  5.0 
50 ￿ 60  7.0  3.9  1.4  6.2 
60 ￿ 70  6.8  3.8  1.4  8.5 
70 ￿ 80  6.8  3.8  1.3  11.8 
80 ￿ 90  6.7  3.8  1.3  17.5 
90 ￿ 95  6.4  3.6  1.3  12.8 
95 ￿ 97.25  6.4  3.6  1.3  4.4 
97.25 ￿ 98.5  6.3  3.5  1.2  5.1 
98.5 ￿ 99.25  6.2  3.5  1.2  5.7 
99.25 ￿ 100  5.9  3.3  1.2  11.2 
All households  6.7  3.8  1.3  100.0 
 Source: Author￿s calculations using data from Thurlow and van Seventer (2002) 
 
Since low-income households have lower savings rates, the shift in income towards these 
households reduces the overall level of real savings in the economy.
10 T h i s  f o r c e s  a  
decline in real investment spending by 5.9 percent. Therefore there is an aggregate shift 
away from investment and towards consumption spending, and since the latter is less 
import-intensive, this reduces the level of import demand. Furthermore, since investment 
spending is more intensive in its use of skilled labor and capital, there is a decline in the 
demand for these factor categories as reflected by their falling factor returns. Since high-
income households receive a larger share of their income from these two factors, this 
further reduces the income of high-income households relative to low-income 
households.  
 
The overall impact of the grant is a fall in real factor returns and employment, and a 
slight reduction in real GDP by 0.8 percent. As domestic production falls there is a 
decline in exports, and, despite the falling level of imports, the real exchange rate is 
forced to depreciate by 0.5 percent in order to partially alleviate the fall in exports and 
                                                 
10 See Thurlow and van Seventer (2002) for a detailed discussion of the different income and expenditure 
patterns of the various representative households within the model.  
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further reduce imports such that the current account balance is maintained in the new 
equilibrium.  
Table 2: The Impact of a Universal Basic Income Grant  
 




(R billion ￿ 





       
Real  GDP  (market  prices) 774.1 -0.8  0.1 -1.3 -0.6 
Consumer  price  index   7.6 0.0 0.0 2.4 
Real exchange rate  
   (LCU per FCU) 
 
0.5 -0.1 -0.1  0.1 
       
Real Absorption       
Real  total  absorption  765.5 -0.8  0.1 -1.3 -0.6 
Private  consumption  465.7 0.2 1.1 6.0 2.5 
Private  investment  123.2 -5.9 -3.5  0.0 -3.1 
Government  consumption  185.8 0.0 0.0  -20.2  -6.9 
Exports  190.2 -1.4 -0.5  2.2  0.2 
Imports  -181.6 -1.5 -0.5  2.3  0.2 
       
Factor Employment 
a         
Capital   . . . . 
Unskilled  labor   -1.4  0.4 -5.8 -2.3 
Semi-skilled labor    -2.1 -0.1 -2.8 -1.6 
Skilled  labor   . . . . 
       
Real Factor Returns 
b       
Capital   -4.6  0.2 -0.1 -1.4 
Unskilled  labor   . . . .     
Semi-skilled  labor   . . . .     
Skilled  labor   -5.7 -0.7  0.5 -1.8 
       
Real Household Consumption Spending by Household Income Decile  
0  ￿  10  6.8 73.0 78.9 75.8 75.7 
10  ￿  20  9.5 57.6 61.7 59.6 59.5 
20  ￿  30  13.0 32.8 37.4 35.5 35.1 
30  ￿  40  16.8 22.1 25.1 24.8 23.9 
40  ￿  50  21.6 10.6 13.5 14.2 12.7 
50  ￿  60  27.7 5.6 8.1 9.5 7.8 
60  ￿  70  38.5 0.4 2.6 5.0 2.7 
70  ￿  80  54.3 -3.6 -2.1  1.8 -1.2 
80  ￿  90  80.9 -5.5 -5.5  0.6 -3.3 
90 ￿ 95  62.7  -6.8 -7.7 -0.4 -4.8 
95 ￿ 97.25  21.4  -7.3 -7.0 -0.8 -4.9 
97.25 ￿ 98.5  25.3  -7.7 -7.2 -0.5 -5.0 
98.5 ￿ 99.25  28.5  -7.8 -8.7 -0.5 -5.5 
99.25 ￿ 100  58.7  -8.5 -8.4 -0.2 -5.5 
All  households  465.7 0.2 1.1 6.0 2.5 
Source: Author￿s calculations
 
a Capital and skilled labor are assumed to be fully employed.  
b Unskilled and semi-skilled labor are assumed to face a fixed real wage. 
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Although real GDP declines, the redistributive effects of the grant on real household 
consumption remain progressive. As can be seen from the lower half of Table 2, there is a 
rise in real consumption amongst poorer households and a fall in consumption amongst 
higher income households. Given their initially low consumption levels, the percentage 
increase in low-income household consumption is considerable.  
 
According to Duncan (2001), the BIG Coalition claims that an additional two percentage 
points on the current sales tax book rate would be sufficient to finance the BIG. However, 
the results from this simulation predict that an average increase of closer to four 
percentage points on the current collection rate is more accurate. Furthermore, in the 
absence of any productivity increases resulting from the BIG, this financing option 
appears to have a slight negative impact on real GDP. There therefore appears to be a 
conflict between the poverty-alleviating benefits of the grant, and the negative 
macroeconomic impact of financing of the grant.  
 
Financing through Increased Personal and Corporate Tax Rates  
 
As mentioned, South Africa￿s largest trade union is opposed to an increase in sales taxes 
as a result of its regressive nature, preferring rather to suggest a ￿solidarity tax￿ on high 
income earners as an alternative means of financing the BIG. The progressive nature of 
current direct taxes can be seen in the first column of Table 3. Low-income households 
are subject to substantially lower income tax rates relative to those faced by higher 
income households. In response to the trade union￿s suggested financing option, this 
simulation evaluates the impact of the BIG were it to be financed solely through an 
increase in direct tax rates on both households and enterprises. The results are presented 
in the third column of Table 2. 
 
The initial impact of the additional transfer to households is to raise the level of real 
private consumption. However, in order to maintain the budget deficit, the government is 
forced to raise the necessary revenue by increasing direct tax rates on domestic 
institutions. This reduces the level of post-tax disposable income available to households  
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and therefore partially offsets the increase in real consumption such that it increases by 
1.1 percent. 
 
Table 3: Changes in Direct Tax Rates  
 
Percentage point deviation from initial 




Initial tax rate 
(Percentage of 




of additional tax 
burden borne by 
income deciles and 
enterprises 
0 ￿ 10  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
10 ￿ 20  1.1  0.4  0.1  0.1 
20 ￿ 30  2.4  0.8  0.3  0.3 
30 ￿ 40  5.3  1.8  0.6  0.9 
40 ￿ 50  8.1  2.8  0.9  1.7 
50 ￿ 60  9.6  3.3  1.1  2.7 
60 ￿ 70  11.3  3.9  1.3  4.5 
70 ￿ 80  13.9  4.8  1.6  8.1 
80 ￿ 90  17.6  6.1  2.1  15.9 
90 ￿ 95  19.3  6.7  2.3  13.9 
95 ￿ 97.25  17.7  6.1  2.1  4.3 
97.25 ￿ 98.5  16.8  5.8  2.0  4.7 
98.5 ￿ 99.25  19.1  6.6  2.2  6.2 
99.25 ￿ 100  15.2  5.3  1.8  9.7 
Enterprises 9.5  3.3  1.1  27.0 
All institutions  12.7  4.4  1.5  100.0 
Source: Author￿s calculations using data from Thurlow and van Seventer (2002) 
 
In order to maintain the progressive structure of direct taxes, the financing of the BIG 
requires that income tax rates on higher income households increase considerably (as 
shown in the second column of Table 3). While low-income households bear a small 
portion of the additional tax burden (shown in the final column), high-income households 
pay substantially more income tax. Furthermore, a large portion of the additional tax 
revenue is acquired through higher corporate taxation (which can be seen as a tax on 
capital income). This negatively impacts on higher income households since they are 
largely the indirect beneficiaries of returns to capital. Ultimately, in order to finance the 
grant, the overall average direct tax rate would have to increase by a predicted 4.4 
percentage points. 
 
Since higher income households have higher marginal propensities to save, the reduction 
in these households￿ incomes reduces the level of savings in the economy, and this in turn  
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decreases investment spending by 3.5 percent. This shift out of investment and towards 
private consumption leads to an increase in the demand for those commodities that lie 
disproportionately within low-income households￿ consumption bundle. This is 
particularly true for textiles (which is unskilled labor intensive) and food (whose 
agricultural intermediates are more capital-intensive). This change in the distribution of 
production leads to an increase in employment for unskilled labor, and an increase in real 
factor returns for capital. The relative magnitudes of the changes in these sources of 
household incomes further strengthen the progressive impact of the BIG. 
 
Finally, since investment is more import-intensive than consumption spending, the fall in 
investment has a negative impact on the level of import demand. This places pressure on 
the current account balance such that the real exchange rate is forced to appreciate 
slightly in order to curb the fall in imports and reduce the level of exports. Ultimately the 
BIG under this financing option has a small positive effect on GDP, which increases by 
0.1 percent. 
 
While the above scenario appears to justify the recommendation that direct taxes be used 
in place of sales taxes as a means of financing the BIG, it may be noted that the current 
trend within national policy is to reduce income taxes. Thus the raising of direct tax rates 
by a weighted average of 4.4 percentage points on the current collection rates would 
require a substantial shift in the approach adopted by the National Treasury. Furthermore, 
further consideration would have to be paid to the additional impacts of increased tax 
rates on financial and human capital flight, and on the incidence of tax avoidance.   
 
Financing through Decreased Government Consumption Spending 
 
A further financing option might involve a compositional shift in government spending 
away from consumption expenditure on goods and services and towards increased 
transfers to households. According to the SAM, government consumption spending in 
1998 was 24 percent of GDP and nine times greater than transfer spending. This scenario 
therefore maintains the budget deficit at its original level by substituting additional  
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transfers for consumption expenditure. The results can be found in the fourth column of 
Table 2. 
 
As in the previous simulations, the initial impact of the grant is to raise private 
consumption demand. However, unlike the other financing options, this increase in 
private demand is not partially offset by a reduction in private consumption through 
increased taxation. Rather, the government finances the BIG by reducing its level of 
consumption expenditure by 20 percent. Real private consumption increases by a total of 
6 percent, thus raising domestic production and exports. The current account constraint 
forces a slight appreciation of the real exchange rate so as to maintain the trade balance in 
the new equilibrium.  
 
The negative impact of the grant on the real consumption levels of high income 
households is less than under the other financing options. This is due to the government, 
rather than high-income households, carrying the burden of financing the BIG. There is 
also a dampening of the redistribution effect on lower income households￿ real 
consumption, since government consumption spending, which has now been reduced, is 
one of the largest employers of unskilled and semi-skilled labor.
11 This is shown in Table 
2 by the substantial fall in employment amongst unskilled and semi-skilled labor.  
 
Ultimately, there is a decline in real GDP by 1.3 percent, which is largely driven by a 
drop in employment amongst unskilled and semi-skilled labor (see Table 2). However, 
despite this financing option￿s negative impact on real GDP, it does have a progressive 
impact on total real household consumption. 
 
It should be noted that the above simulation reduced government spending 
proportionately across all commodities, and therefore did not target a particular area of 
the budget. This is an important simplification, since, for example, the increased pressure 
on government health spending for HIV/AIDS treatment makes an across-the-board 
                                                 
11 See Thurlow and van Seventer (2002) for a more detailed description of the impact of fiscal expenditure 
on the South African economy.   
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reduction in government spending implausible. Alternative specifications could allow for 
a reduction in specific components of government expenditure, for example military 
spending, while maintaining other components such as education and health. While this 
simulation did not attempt to reprioritize government spending, the targeting of particular 
commodities would be a more realistic scenario if this financing option were to be 
implemented. 
 
A Financing Package 
 
The results from the three financing simulations outlined above seem to indicate that, if 
used in isolation, each of the financing options place significant pressure on the various 
institutions within the economy. In the case of the two tax-financed scenarios, sales or 
income tax rates increase considerably, and a compositional shift in government spending 
towards the BIG requires a substantial decline in current government consumption 
spending. Since these individual policy recommendations are likely to be economically 
and/or politically infeasible, the following simulation investigates the macroeconomic 
impact of a ￿balanced￿ approach to financing the BIG. The impact of the grant is spread 
evenly over sales and income taxes, and government consumption spending. The results 
are shown in the final column of Table 2. 
 
By removing the dependence on increased sales taxes (as shown in the second column of 
Table 1), private consumption demand is not ultimately reduced by a rise in the consumer 
price index (which increases by only 2.4 percent in this scenario). The forced increase in 
the direct tax rates on households and enterprises is also lessened (as shown in Table 3). 
Although there is no change in the distribution of the burden of the additional direct 
taxes, the distributional impact on real household consumption for higher income 
households is now lessened. This is due to the partial financing of the grant through a 
reduction in government consumption spending, which doesn￿t offset private 
consumption spending by as much as the other financing options. There is a drop in 
employment amongst unskilled and semi-skilled labor, due largely to the fall in  
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government consumption expenditure. However, the overall negative effect of this rising 
unemployment on real GDP is lessened through direct tax financing. 
 
Additional simulations (not presented in this paper) show that, under the balanced 
financing scenario, the productivity of unskilled labor would have to increase by 
approximately 11 percent in order to maintain the level of employment in this factor 
category and neutralize the negative impact of the grant on real GDP. Whether such a 
productivity increase is possible can only be adequately determined by a micro-level 
assessment of the grant.
12 
 
Although the scale of the grant remains unchanged in this simulation, the burden of the 
￿balanced￿ financing option is spread over domestic institutions. Sales and direct tax rates 
increase by 1.3 and 1.5 percentage points respectively as opposed to roughly 4 percentage 
points. Finally, government consumption expenditure is reduced by 7 percent rather than 
20 percent.  
 
The results of the ￿balanced￿ financing option appear to be more politically and 
economically feasible than those of the previous simulations (where only a single policy 
instrument was adjusted to finance the BIG). However, the results from the balanced 
scenario still suggest that implementing the universal grant is likely to have a significant 
and negative impact on various areas of the South African macroeconomy. Perhaps the 
most notable of those areas negatively affected are the levels of employment amongst 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This rising unemployment suggests that the BIG 
might lead to greater welfare-dependency amongst the country￿s unemployed. These 
conflicting policy objectives, as well as the scale of the macroeconomic adjustment 
required to implement and finance the grant, might undermine the benefits of a universal 
as opposed to a targeted grant.
13 
 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed discussion of the macroeconomic impact of productivity changes on South African 
economic activity see Thurlow and van Seventer (2002). 
13 For a review of the benefits of basic income grants, see Atkinson (1995).  
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However, despite the differing macroeconomic impacts of the various financing options, 
the redistributive impact of the BIG remains consistently progressive across all of the 
above simulations. These results therefore suggest that, should a universal grant be 
favored over a targeted one, then the current debate should redirect its attention to finding 
the correct balance of policy measures to finance the BIG in a manner that does not cause 
macroeconomic problems. This would be preferable to the current approach that focuses 
almost exclusively on the microeconomic impacts of the universal grant and the 
advocating of a single financing option. Such a shift would reduce the contention 




Contention has arisen during the period leading up to the release of the Taylor Report, 
regarding the possible implementation of a basic income grant in South Africa. While 
much of the current debate has centered around research on the microeconomic benefits 
of a universal grant, this study has attempted to address the macroeconomic issue of 
whether such a grant is viable in terms of the demands it places on the South African 
macroeconomy and on the government￿s budget. This has been done by considering the 
macroeconomic impact of the BIG under a variety of financing scenarios.  
 
The scale of the BIG requires that the government either raise revenue or reduce current 
expenditure in order to implement the grant. To this end, the study simulated the impact 
of the BIG under an increase in sales and income tax rates, as well as a reduction in 
government consumption spending. These results suggest that the current financing 
recommendations of the Taylor Report and the BIG Coalition have underestimated the 
required increases in sales and income tax rates. Furthermore, the required reduction in 
government consumption expenditure to finance the grant is likely to undermine other 
government programs. Given that these results may be political infeasible, the study 
considered a ￿balanced￿ package of financing options. Despite spreading the burden of 
financing the grant across the various institutions within the economy, this financing 
scenario still resulted in the strongly progressive redistribution of real household  
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consumption that is characteristic of this universal grant, albeit at the cost of lower real 
GDP. 
 
Given the significant and often negative macroeconomic impact of implementing a 
universal grant in South Africa, further attention should be paid to clearly identifying the 
benefits of a universal over a targeted grant. A targeted program would substantially 
reduce the fiscal burden of the government￿s poverty-alleviation strategy.  
 
However, as already stated, this study is not directed at assessing the microeconomic 
benefits of universal as opposed to targeted grants. If it is shown that a universal grant is 
better at addressing poverty in South Africa, then the current debate surrounding the BIG 
would be greatly enhanced by a more rigorous consideration of its macroeconomic 
impact, and by a shift in focus away from determining which individual financing option 
should be implemented, towards an acknowledgement that a ￿balanced￿ approach is likely 
to provide the only possible financing scenario. For example, the Taylor Report’s 
suggestion, that economic growth would be facilitated through an increase in aggregate 
demand, does not appear to take into account other potentially negative macroeconomic 
impacts of the chosen financing option. Furthermore, in the absence of such 
macroeconomic considerations, the recommended increase in only taxes to finance the 
BIG is likely to be either economically or politically infeasible. 
 
Model results indicate that, under the balanced approach to financing the BIG, an 11 
percent increase in unskilled labor productivity would be required to outweigh the 
negative impact of the grant on real GDP. Although this provides a provisional estimate, 
further and more detailed research is needed to determine whether the productivity gains 
predicted by the Taylor Report are likely to materialize, and whether these gains will be 
sufficiently large to overcome the negative impact of the grant on economic growth. Such 
research would greatly inform the more critical debate as to whether a BIG is preferable 
to alternative approaches aimed at addressing poverty and inequality. However, while 
this study is unable to determine the microeconomic advantages of targeted as opposed to  
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universal grants, the above results do suggest that the income distributional effects of the 
latter are progressive. 
 
In the context of pervasive absolute poverty and inequality, the consideration of poverty 
alleviation measures is of critical importance. According to Tilton (quoted in 
Terreblanche, 2001), ￿[the BIG] would enhance the provisions of the [new South 
African] constitution by not only giving people the right to life but also the means to 
live.￿ However, the successful addressing of poverty in South Africa depends on the 
ability of policy-makers to construct sustainable and appropriately targeted interventions, 
which in turn are able to elicit consensus in a country typified by conflicting political and 
social objectives. Unfortunately, while the BIG appears to overcome the problem of 
identifying the poor, the decision of whether South Africa can become Africa￿s first 
welfare state might not necessarily be determined by a universal grant￿s ability to 
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